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RACIAL PROFILING: NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
POLICY ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
LATASHA CHAFFIN 
Grand Valley State University 
 
 
 
Racial profiling was traditionally viewed as an issue that primarily affected 
African-Americans and Latino Americans.  After September 11th the issue of 
racial profiling has expanded to more directly affect Central and South Asian 
Americans, Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, members of other communities 
perceived to originate from the Middle East and immigrants and Americans of 
foreign descent.  These communities are joining with African-American and 
Latino communities to support national racial profiling legislation on a broader 
level, not just in traffic stops, but in regulation of all interaction with law 
enforcement including at airports.  The national racial profiling legislation 
debate presents three important research questions: (1)Is racial profiling by law 
enforcement a pervasive problem in the United States? (2) What legislation, if 
any, is required to combat against racial profiling? (3) How can anecdotal 
evidence of racial profiling be strengthened to provide statistical proof? 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The first national racial profiling legislation was sponsored and 
introduced by U.S. Representative John Conyers Jr. of the 14th Congressional 
District of Michigan. This national racial profiling legislative policy analysis 
focuses on the racial profiling legislation that was first introduced by Rep. John 
Conyers in 1998 and the succession of legislative proposals that has been 
introduced and sponsored four additional times since 1998 by Rep. John 
Conyers, D-Michigan in the House and Senator Russ Feingold D-Wisconsin in 
the Senate addressing the issue of racial profiling.  There has been other 
proposed national racial profiling legislation, yet the legislation that U.S. Rep. 
John Conyers and Senator Russ Feingold have drafted is the most 
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comprehensive. The purpose of the proposed national racial profiling legislation 
by Rep. Conyers and Sen. Feingold is to:  
“Enforce the constitutional right to equal protection of the laws, 
pursuant to the Fifth Amendment and section 5 of the 14th Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States; to enforce the constitutional 
right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, pursuant 
to the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; and 
to enforce the constitutional right to interstate travel, pursuant to 
section 2 of article IV of the Constitution of the United States; and to 
regulate interstate commerce, pursuant to clause 3 of section 8 of article 
I of the Constitution of the United States (ERPA, 2004, p. 4).”  
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF RACIAL PROFILING 
 
Law enforcement and legal experts trace the origin of racial profiling to 
the 1980s at the advent of the crack epidemic, when sketches of typical drug 
traffickers were, according to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 
Black and Hispanic males under 30. Hubert Williams, president of the Police 
Foundation, a law enforcement think tank in Washington D.C. states that these 
profiles are “skewed because they are based on arrest statistics that don’t include 
people living in majority-white suburbs (Dade, 1999, p. 6)”.  According to the 
Justice Department, White Americans committed 62% of drug-related crimes in 
1998 (Dade, 1999). 
Proving that racial profiling is a widespread practice is a challenge 
because the substantiating evidence is primarily anecdotal.  However, in 1999, 
estimates from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) and ACLU indicated that African-Americans account for more than 
70% of the nation’s traffic stops while comprising less than 20% of its drivers.   
“In 1994, Congress gave the Department of Justice its Pattern or 
Practice Authority to initiate investigations into racial profiling and 
discrimination occurring with the criminal justice system (McMickle 2003, p. 
1).”  However the argument has been made that “victims rarely file formal 
complaints out of fear of police retribution or because they feel powerless to 
fight the bias, according to civil libertarians and legal experts (Dade, 1999, p. 
3).” Hence, the argument has been made by Rep. Conyers and supporters of his 
Racial Profiling legislation that these are the reasons national legislation needs 
to be enacted and a national study needs to be conducted.  A study would 
provide the statistical data needed to evaluate current traffic and other stopping 
practices in order to address the issue of racial profiling nationally.   
As of November 15, 2000, the Department of Justice “had 14 publicly 
noticed, ongoing, pattern or practice investigations involving allegations of 
racial profiling, and had filed 5 pattern and practice lawsuits involving 
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allegations of racial profiling, with 4 of those cases resolved through consent 
decrees (ERPA, 2004, p. 3).” 
 
RACIAL PROFILING LEGISLATION 
 
1998 Proposed Legislation:  The Traffic Stops Statistics Act (H.R. 118) 
  
The Traffic Stops Statistics Act, proposed in 1998, was the first 
national legislation presented before Congress on the civil rights issue of racial 
profiling.  The bill passed with a unanimous vote by the House Judiciary 
Committee and was referred to the senate judiciary committee.  Unfortunately, 
the bill stalled in the Senate. The committee never voted on the measure, nor did 
it hold any meetings.   
The Act required the collection of several categories of data by law 
enforcement officers on each traffic stop, including the race of the driver and 
whether a search was performed.  An additional tenant of the bill required that 
the Attorney General conduct a study analyzing the data, which would be the 
first nationwide, statistically rigorous study of these practices (Scott, 2000). 
The idea of HR 118 as described by the American Civil Liberties 
Union (2000), “was if the study confirmed what people of color have 
experienced for decades, it would put to rest the idea that African Americans 
and other people of color are exaggerating isolated anecdotes into a social 
problem.  Congress and other bodies might then begin to take concrete steps to 
channel police discretion more appropriately (Scott, 2000 p. 1).” 
 
1999 Proposed Legislation:  The Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1999 (H.R. 
1443/S. 821)  
 
One year later, in 1999, Conyers re-introduced the Traffic Stops 
Statistics Act.  The Act was known as the “Driving While Black or Brown” bill. 
The Traffic Stops Statistics Act was sponsored by Rep. Conyers in the House 
and Senators Frank Lauterberg D-New Jersey and Russ Feingold D-Wisconsin 
in the Senate.  Introduced in April of 1999, the legislation was similar to Traffic 
Stops Statistics Act proposed in 1998.  However, in addition to officers tracking 
statistical data of those they stop and the Justice Department conducting a 
national study, the 1999 Act required officers to list the rationale for any 
subsequent search and any contraband acquired.  The 1999 Traffic Stops 
Statistics Act legislation met the same fate as the previous 1998 proposal as it 
did not pass.   
In April 1999, President Clinton issued an Executive Order that called 
for federal law enforcement officials to collect data on race and gender of the 
people they stop to question or arrest.  President Clinton (2000) stated in his 
Executive Order, “We must stop the morally indefensible, deeply corrosive 
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practice of racial profiling.  We all have an obligation to move beyond anecdotes 
to find out exactly who is being stopped and why (Scott, 2000 p. 3).” 
 
2001 Legislation:  The End Racial Profiling Act (H.R. 2074/S. 989) 
 
President Bush called for an end to racial profiling in a statement on 
February 27, 2001.   Hours after President Bush promised in a joint session of 
Congress that he would act of the issue of racial profiling President Bush 
expressed,  
“It’s wrong, and we will end it in America.  In so doing, we will not 
hinder the work of our nation’s brave police officers.  They protect us 
every day – often at great risk.  But by stopping the abuses of a few, we 
will add to the public confidence our police offers earn and deserve 
(Burns, 2001, p. 1).”   
 
President Bush directed U.S. Attorney General Ashcroft to “review the 
use by federal law enforcement authorities of race as a factor in conducting 
stops, searches and other investigative procedures (Burns, 2001 p. 1).” He also 
ordered Ashcroft to “work with Congress to develop methods or mechanisms to 
collect any relevant data from federal law enforcement agencies and work in 
cooperation with state and local law enforcement in order to assess the extent 
and nature of any such practices (Burns, 2001 p. 1).” 
Subsequent to President Bush’s directive, Ashcroft declared the 
practice of racial profiling as unconstitutional.  Ashcroft asked for a national 
study, and stated that the Department of Justice would be reviewing federal and 
state laws and agency coordination. 
Within a few days of this announcement Attorney General Ashcroft 
met with members of the Congressional Black Caucus.  After the meeting he 
stated “We’re going to follow the president’s directive but we are going to 
enforce the laws that are on the books (Burns, 2001, p. 1). 
The National Urban League took a “wait and see attitude on Bush’s 
action (Burns, 2001 p. 2).  The National Urban League wanted to see what 
action was actually going to be taken at state and local levels. 
A spokesperson for Rep. Conyers stated that rhetoric provided by 
President Bush and Attorney General Ashcroft was “nothing new” by the federal 
government and was consistent with what was done under Clinton, meaning no 
real action (McConnell 2001, p. 2).  A spokesperson for President Bush, Scott 
Stanzel, stated that Justice officials were “undertaking a review of actually how 
we can take on racial profiling, an action that went beyond the previous 
administration (McConnell, 2001, p. 2).” 
The End Racial Profiling Act of 2001 was unveiled at a bi-partisan 
news conference June 6, 2001 by Rep. Conyers.  It was unveiled in the Senate 
by Sen. Russ Feingold.  This legislation was more aggressive than the two 
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earlier proposals in 1998 and 1999.  In addition to the requirements cited in the 
earlier proposals, the legislation nationally prohibited racial profiling.  Also, the 
Act allowed for the Attorney General to provide federal grants to help law 
enforcements comply with the Act by developing policies on racial profiling, 
cultural awareness training and equipment such as video cameras or moving 
surveillance equipment.  The act also allowed for an independent process to be 
instituted whereby citizens can make complaints.  Additionally the bill proposed 
that financial remedies including court fees be accessible through the legal 
process.  The Act further called for the development of discipline procedures for 
officers found guilty of racial profiling and the potential for government grants 
to be taken away from law enforcement agencies that are not in compliance with 
the legislation (ERPA, 2001).   
Conyers stated upon introducing the Racial Profiling Act of 2001, 
“since I first introduced this kind of legislation….the pervasive nature of racial 
profiling has gone from anecdote and theory to established and documented fact 
(McConnell 2001, p. 1).” 
When the End Racial Profiling Act of 2001 was introduced, Conyers 
acknowledged that the bill contained language that might be a hurdle to blocking 
passage.   According to the bill, proof of profiling would come if “routine 
investigatory activities of agencies have had a disparate impact on racial or 
ethnic minorities, which shall constitute prima facie evidence (McConnell, 2001, 
p. 2).  “This evidence could be interpreted as meaning obvious without proof or 
reasoning (McConnell, 2001, p. 2)”  However, Conyers indicated that he and his 
co-sponsors spent a lot of time on that part of the bill and that it was based on 
similar state legislation. 
Another criticism of the bill by officials was that the proposed funding 
for the legislation would come from the Justice Department budget. Officials 
noted that “a program to hire more officers for neighborhood policing programs, 
known as the Community-Oriented Policing Services, had money eliminated in 
Bush’s budget (McConnell, 2001 p. 2).”   
In addition some agencies complained of the mandatory requirement, claiming 
the data could be misinterpreted (McConnell, 2001).   
Several state agencies across the country, including the Michigan State 
Police volunteered to collect statistics. In 2001, The Michigan State Police study 
reported that Black men received 22,022 of the 255, 954 traffic citations issued 
in 2000, and “as a result of doing this, we do not believe we have a systemic 
problem,” said Capt. Jack Shepherdson, commander of the agency’s executive 
division (Dade, 1999 pp. 7 - 8).”.   
Farmington Hills, MI Police Chief William Dwyer, stated “Officers 
already collect racial data on traffic tickets and that racial profiling these days 
“is extremely rare.” “Some people just use this as a political platform.  
“Sometimes it’s a cheap shot against law enforcement (Dade , 1999 pp. 7 – 8).” 
Yet, by 2001, 10 states had passed laws requiring police agencies to collect data 
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on the race of drivers stopped by police.  Three other states banned racial 
profiling. 
 
September 11, 2001, Racial Profiling & The USA Patriot Act 
 
Racial profiling was traditionally viewed as an issue that primarily 
affected African-Americans and Latino Americans.  After September 11th the 
issue of racial profiling has expanded to more directly affect Central and South 
Asian Americans, Arab Americans, Muslim Americans, members of other 
communities perceived to originate from the Middle East and immigrants and 
Americans of foreign descent.  These communities are joining with African-
American and Latino communities to support national racial profiling legislation 
on a broader level, not just in traffic stops, but in regulation of all interaction 
with law enforcement including at airports.   
Enacted October 26, 2001, The USA Patriot Act has provoked 
controversy.  Many citizens, minority and non-minority and civil libertarians 
share the view that The Patriot Act is a violation of our civil liberties and of the 
protections of Fourth Amendment detailed in the U.S. Constitution against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The Patriot Act has expanded the powers of law enforcement through 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and allowed for “sneak and peak” 
warrants which allow law enforcement officers to enter private residences and 
search through private property without having to notify the terrorism “suspect” 
until well after the search.   
The Patriot Act also has allowed federal agents to access numerous 
private records including medical, business, financial, library and internet 
records without showing probable cause.  The Patriot Act forces librarians, 
internet service providers, health care providers and other keepers of records to 
disclose information to intelligence agencies.   
The law has provided authorization for U.S. immigration officials to 
detain non-citizens as terrorism suspects. Once the Attorney General certifies 
that the government  “has reasonable ground to believe that an alien is a terrorist 
or is engaged in other activity that endangers the national security of the United 
States”, they can be detained indefinitely (Dority, 2004, p. 1).” 
Under The Patriot Act surveillance is increased through wire-tapping, 
search warrants, pen/trap orders, and subpoenas.  Trials can also be denied for 
citizens or non-citizens considered enemy combatants (Rhoads, 2003). 
Egyptian human rights activist and sociology professor, Saad Eddin 
Ibrahim (2004) expressed his outrage at The Patriot Act, “Every dictator is using 
what the United States has done under The Patriot Act to justify human abuses 
in the past, as well as a license to continue human rights abuses (Dority 2004, p. 
1). 
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 Kwesi Mfume (2002), president and CEO of the NAACP supported 
The Patriot Act expressing, “I recognize, like everybody else, the need to protect 
civil liberties.”  “But at the same time, in order to be effective, [law enforcement 
officials] have got to question people, and in some instances, detain people until 
questions are adequately answered (Harris & Hughes, 2002, p. 1).” 
After September 11, 2001 the FBI questioned, detained and deported 
many Arab, Muslim, and South Asian men.  The majority of detainees were not 
charged with any crimes nor had any involvement with September 11th.  The 
Justice Department (2003) admitted that “at least 766 persons were detained on 
“special interest” charges after September 11 and held; of these, 511 have been 
deported.  The Justice Department claims that among those deported were some 
who could have been – but have not been - charged with terrorism offenses 
(Stein, 2003 p. 2).”  This detention of classifications of people based on their 
national origin has been compared to the internment of Japanese-Americans 
during World War II (ACLU Sanctioned Bias, 2004). 
After September 11th, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now 
merged with the Office Homeland Security required males over age 16 who are 
not permanent residents from 25 countries to register, be fingerprinted, 
photographed and questioned through a new Special Registration Program 
entitled The National Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS).  
Males from the following countries were targeted:  Afghanistan, Algeria, 
Bahrain, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, 
Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan and Kuwait.  Special 
Registration was mandated to be completed in February and March of 2001, and 
all males meeting the status requirements are required to re-register annually and 
when leaving the United States (Stein, 2003).   
A report was issued in April 2003 by the Department of Justice that 
revealed the Justice Department’s policies, directives, and activities in wake of 
the Sept. 11th attacks entitled “The September 11 Detainees:  A Review of the 
Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the 
Investigation of the September 11 Attacks or known as “The OIG Report” 
(ACLU Sanctioned Bias, 2004).  The report detailed the treatment of non-
citizens held on immigration charges after September 11, which included: 
“failure to notify detainees of the immigration charges against them in a 
timely manner, making it difficult for detainees to obtain bonds and 
meet with attorneys, detaining them in harsh conditions (e.g. leaving 
lights on in their cells for twenty-four hours), and subjecting detainees 
to verbal and sometimes physical abuse (Johnson, 2004 p. 4).” 
 
 Many states have passed resolutions requesting that local law 
enforcement refrain from federal investigations that violate citizens’ civil 
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liberties including California, Colorado, Maryland, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and 
Washington (Rhoads, 2003).    
As a result of Arabs, Muslims, Asians, and other communities being 
profiled in airports across the country, the familiar phrase “Driving While 
Black,” or “Driving While Black or Brown,” has been extended and “Flying 
While Arab” has been added to the vocabulary (Johnson, 2004, p. 4).” 
 
2003 Efforts 
  
The Justice Department issued guidelines in June 2003 approved by 
President Bush prohibiting federal law enforcement officers from using race or 
ethnicity in routine activities such as traffic stops, even though such practices 
might not be prohibited in the Constitution or federal laws.  The Department of 
Justice Guidelines banned racial and ethnic profiling at all 70 federal agencies 
with law enforcement powers.  However, the guidelines allow officers to 
consider those factors in preventing threats to national security.  This exception 
was challenged by several minority and civil libertarian groups.  In addition, the 
guidelines apply only to federal authorities.  The guidelines do not address state 
and local officials.   The Justice Department responded that they do not have the 
authority to prohibit state and local authorities from racial profiling; only 
Congress can with legislation (The Associated Press, 2003). 
The same day that the Justice Department announced the new 
guidelines, Conyers (2003) issued a statement urging support for the End Racial 
Profiling Act stating “The vast majority of racial profiling complaints arise from 
the activities of state and local law enforcement agencies.  He added that “while 
these (DOJ) guidelines send a signal, they are not a replacement for the 
enactment of comprehensive federal anti-profiling legislation.  Conyers asked 
for support in his initiative and urged the Justice Department to work with him 
on the legislation (Frieden, 2003 p. 1).” 
Assistant Attorney General Ralph Boyd Jr. stated “Today’s 
guidance…is the clearest and most comprehensive statement and guidance 
regarding the consideration of race and ethnicity in law enforcement activities 
from any administration ever.  We’ve done our very best to get it right (Frieden, 
2003 p. 1).” Boyd added that the federal guidelines were meant to be a model 
for state guidelines.   
The ACLU disagreed. The director of the ACLU office in Washington, 
Laura Murphy stated “The guidelines acknowledge racial profiling as a national 
concern but do nothing to stop it.  The new policy guidelines provide no rights 
or remedies (Frieden, 2003, p. 1).” 
In 2003, minority advocacy groups, legal and civil rights groups, along 
with democratic legislators continued to mount support for national racial 
profiling legislation.  The coalition amongst all minority groups became stronger 
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leading to a re-birth and re-introduction of The End Racial Profiling Act in 
2004. 
 
The End Profiling Act of 2004 (ERPA) – (H.R. 3847 S. 2132) 
 
The End Racial Profiling Act of 2004 was introduced on February 26, 
2004 by Sen. Russell Feingold (D-WI) and Sen. Jon Corzine (D-NJ) in the 
Senate.  Rep. John Conyers (D-MI) and Rep. Chris Shays (R-CT) introduced the 
bill in the House.  The bill had 126 co-sponsors, of which 125 were democratic 
and one was independent.   
The proposed End Racial Profiling Act of 2004 legislation defines 
racial profiling as the “practice of relying on race, ethnicity, religion, or national 
origin to select which individuals are subject to a law enforcement encounter 
(ACLU Sanctioned Bias 2004, p. 3).”  Religion was added to The End Racial 
Profiling Act of 2004 since the proposed End Racial Profiling Act of 2001.  
The End Racial Profiling Act legislation would make racial profiling 
practices illegal by banning profiling at all levels of law enforcement, not just 
the federal level and make compliance a condition of law enforcement agencies 
receiving federal funding.  The bill proposes that grants be awarded to police 
departments for data collections systems to track and identify discriminatory 
policing and training to prevent racial profiling.  The legislation would introduce 
a nationally uniform data collection system of routine investigatory activities 
that would be submitted to the Attorney General (ACLU Sanctioned Bias, 2004, 
p. 3). 
The End Racial Profiling Act would provide victims of racial profiling 
with legal recourse (right to sue) in order to hold law enforcement agencies 
accountable and establish independent procedures for receiving, investigating 
and responding to complaints of racial profiling.  Additionally, the bill would 
require the establishment of procedures to discipline law enforcement agents 
who engage in racial profiling (ERPA, 2004).  
 Given the increased support for national racial profiling legislation by 
numerous minority advocacy and civil rights groups after September 11th and 
the injustices and civil rights violations alleged to have occurred against 
minorities based on their national origin and ethnicity, the findings section of the 
End Racial Profiling Act of 2004 reads: 
“In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, many Arabs, 
Muslims, Central and South Asians, and Sikhs, as well as other 
immigrants and Americans of foreign descent, were treated with 
generalized suspicion and subjected to searches and seizures based 
upon criminal conduct.  Such profiling has failed to produce tangible 
benefits, yet has created a fear and mistrust of law enforcement 
agencies in theses communities (ERPA, 2004, p. 4). 
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 Rep. John Conyers (2004) commented after the introduction of the End 
Racial Profiling Act of 2004, “Both the President and the Attorney General have 
said that we need federal legislation and that the practice of racial profiling 
should be prohibited.”  Rep. Conyers further expressed, “this bill does that and 
we’re anxious to work with the Administration to make this happen 
(Weathersby, 2004, p. 1).” 
Rep. Conyers (2004) also expressed, “Data collected from New Jersey, 
Maryland, Texas, Pennsylvania, Florida, Illinois, Ohio, New York, and 
Massachusetts show beyond a shadow of a doubt that African 
Americans and Latinos are being stopped for routine traffic violations 
far in excess of their share of the population or even the rate in which 
such populations are accused of criminal conduct.  A recent Justice 
Department report found that although African-Americans and 
Hispanics are more likely to be stopped and searched by law 
enforcement, they are much less likely to be found in possession of 
contraband (Weathersby, 2004, p. 1).” 
 
The End Racial Profiling Act of 2004 states in section 2, Findings and 
Purposes,  
 
“The Department of Justice Guidance [2003], is a useful first step, but 
does not achieve the President’s stated goal of ending racial profiling in 
America:  it does not apply to State and local law enforcement 
agencies, does not contain a meaningful enforcement mechanism, does 
not require data collection, and contains an overbroad exception for 
immigration and national security matters (ERPA, 2004, pp. 2-3).” 
 
 The International Association of Chiefs of Police, the world’s oldest 
and largest nonprofit membership organization of police executives, has adopted 
a resolution condemning racial profiling: 
“We must ensure that racial and ethnic profiling is not substituted for 
reasonable suspicion in traffic stops and other law enforcement 
activities.  The best way to ensure the trust of citizens and the courts, 
and to protect our officers from unfair criticism, is to develop an anti-
profiling policy that delineates approved techniques for professional 
traffic stops, and makes a clear statement that profiling is not one of 
those techniques (ACLU Sanctioned Bias, 2004. p. 2).” 
 
The End Racial Profiling Act of 2004 was referred to the House 
subcommittee on crime, terrorism, and homeland security on April 2, 2004 in 
the current 108th session of  Congress.  However, a decision regarding the 
passage of the bill has not been made.  If the legislation stalls in the House and 
is not passed before the end of 2004, then The End Racial Profiling Act will 
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have to be re-introduced in 2005 in the 109th session of Congress to be 
considered once again for passage.   
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTONS 
 
 The national racial profiling legislation debate presents three important 
research questions: 
 
1. Is racial profiling by law enforcement a pervasive problem in the 
United States? 
 
2. What legislation, if any, is required to combat against racial profiling? 
 
3. How can anecdotal evidence of racial profiling be strengthened to 
provide statistical proof? 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
  
As of 2004, a number of state legislatures have passed legislation 
requiring mandatory data collection by law enforcement officials, among other 
remedies such as racial profiling policies, training, etc.  More than 15 states have 
passed legislation and hundreds of police agencies have instituted racial 
profiling policies and implemented mandatory data collection programs.  
Additionally, many police officers publish the stop and search data collected on 
their websites.  Hundreds of police departments have implemented voluntary 
data collection programs including San Francisco, California; Dearborn, 
Michigan; and Richmond, Virginia.  Statewide data collection systems have 
begun to be implemented in Michigan and Washington (Harris, 2003).   
In June 2001, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, a component of the 
Office of Justice Programs, awarded the Northeastern University Institute on 
Race, research team a grant to create a web based Racial Profiling Data 
Collection Resource Center.  The site is designed to be a central clearinghouse 
for police agencies, legislators, community leaders, social scientists, legal 
researchers, and journalists to access information about current data collection 
efforts, legislation and model policies, police-community initiatives, and 
methodological tools that can be used to collect and analyze data (Racial 
Profiling (NEU), 2004). 
 The problem with many of the state legislatively mandated studies and 
the voluntary studies according to David Harris (2003), Professor of Law and 
Values at the University of Toledo College of Law, is that they are using 
“improper benchmarks (p.7).”  Many of the police departments that are 
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collecting traffic stop data are using census data or population percentages to 
compare to their collected data in order to determine whether the police are 
using racial profiling practices by stopping and/or searching a particular 
group(s) more than they are stopping and/or searching particular other group(s) 
based on race, ethnicity, national origin or religion.  A population percentage 
could be for example, the population of a county, existing of registered drivers 
age 16 and up.   The problem with using census data or population percentages 
is that the driving population in a particular area, highway or “hot spot” of a city 
will most likely yield a totally different racial/ethnic makeup than the census 
population, or population percentage will provide for that respective area 
(Harris, 2003).   
According to David Harris the appropriate benchmark or denominator, 
if you will, to utilize when analyzing collected traffic stop and search data is the 
driving population of the respective area studied.  David Harris (2003) explains 
the rationale of using the appropriate benchmark in a traffic study, 
“If the study looks at who gets stopped while driving, the relevant 
comparison population is the driving population of the jurisdiction 
under study.  If that population is ten percent black, but blacks are 
thirty percent of all drivers stopped and searched, we might legitimately 
wonder whether racial targeting was taking place.  But without the 
benchmark of the racial composition of the driving population, the 
numbers on the stops and searches alone would not have much meaning 
(p. 7).” 
 
In the 1990’s, John Lamberth of Temple University was the first social 
scientist to attempt to measure the racial distribution of driving populations in 
Maryland and New Jersey, where he was an expert witness in their respective 
cases.  John stationed observers on each side of the respective highway and 
turnpike and observers driving in cars.  The observers randomly collected racial 
composition data.  The observers also counted traffic law “violators” and 
determined that no one race or ethnic group violated traffic laws more than 
another.  As a result in both the Maryland and New Jersey cases it was proven 
that African-American and Latino drivers were disproportionately targeted for 
traffic stops and searches.  John Lamberth is applying his technique in more 
mixed traffic law enforcement “hot spots” across the country (Harris, 2003). 
 Data on searches is just as crucial as data on stops.  All drivers commit 
traffic violations and the police use discretion of whom they will stop whether it 
is in traffic, on the street, in airports or elsewhere.  According the US Supreme 
Court, observation of any traffic offense can warrant a stop and detainment to 
issue a citation.  However, unless there is suspicious evidence of a crime taking 
place such as the police officer smelling alcohol on the suspect’s breath, or 
observing drug paraphernalia, or an existing warrant, the law enforcement 
officer can not search your car, or your person without permission.  If there is no 
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suspicion of a crime taking place then the law enforcement officer must seek 
consent to search an individual, their possessions, or vehicle.  However they are 
not required to notify the individual that permission is required.  Data collection 
on searches would provide insight into how many searches are involuntary or 
consensual and with consent searches, who law enforcement officials are 
determining to be more or less suspicious and whom they are using their 
discretion to request a search (Harris, 2003).   
 
FINDINGS 
 
A court-ordered study in Maryland found that more than 70 percent of 
the drivers stopped on I-95 were African American though they made up to only 
17.5 percent of drivers.  A racial profiling victim in Maryland won $95,000 from 
the Maryland State Police Department, along with an agreement for them to 
provide data on highway stops. 
Another study in New Jersey found that “minorities were nearly five 
times as likely as non-minorities to be stopped for traffic violations along the 
turnpike (Scott, 2000 p. 2).”  A New Jersey judge in 1996 tossed out a number 
of drug possession cases because New Jersey troopers illegally targeted 
motorists.  New Jersey settled the first racial profiling case brought by the 
Justice Department under 42 U.S.C.A 14141 in 2000.  In New Jersey the issue 
was so bad that nearby African-American and Latino communities had taken to 
calling the turnpike “White Man’s Pass (Elder, 2001, p. 1).” The consent decree 
in the New Jersey case appoints an independent monitor, requires the state to 
collect traffic stop data and to create new citizen complaint, training and early 
warning procedures for state police (Conyers, 2001).   
In response to criticism and allegations of racial profiling, New Jersey 
state officials commissioned their own study.  The study showed that blacks are 
twice as likely as whites to speed down their state’s highways.  Civil rights 
leaders denounced the study and Justice Department officials called the study 
“faulty, flawed, and poorly designed (Hutchinson, 2002, p. 1).”   
On March 14, 2003, New Jersey Governor James E. McGreevey signed 
the New Jersey Racial Profiling Statute into law.  New Jersey became the first 
state to make racial profiling through race-based arrests and police searches 
illegal.  New Jersey’s law enforcement officers are “barred from using racial 
characteristics or color as foundation for triggering an investigative stop (Swan, 
2003 p. 3).”  Racial profiling legislation advocates including civil rights 
organizations welcomed the legislation yet State Troopers Fraternal Association 
officials did not embrace the legislation (Swan, 2003).   
Now that an influx of data is being collected and studies performed to 
statistically prove the existence of racial profiling practices by law enforcement, 
law enforcement officers and police agencies have switched gears from out an 
out and out denial of racial profiling practices to the arguing that minorities 
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commit the majority of crimes and therefore rationalize that profiling minorities 
based on race is appropriate.  Many law enforcement officials share this 
widespread belief. For example, it is factual that African-Americans are over-
represented among those arrested and imprisoned in this country. However 
according to David Harris (2003), Professor of Law and Values at the University 
of Toledo College of Law,  
“Arrest rates are not, as many seem to believe, measurements of crime.  
The same goes for statistics on incarceration.  Arrest rates and 
imprisonment rates may have some relationship to actual rates of 
offending, but how close a relationship, whether it varies by the type of 
crime, and how greatly it varies are all questions that at best remain 
unanswered by simply citing arrest and imprisonment statistics (p. 5).”   
 
 The answer according to David Harris (2003), lies in the “hit rate (p. 
5).”  According to the ACLU, “studies consistently show that “hit rates” -  the 
discovery of contraband or evidence of other illegal conduct among minorities 
stopped and searched by the police are lower than “hit rates” for whites who are 
stopped and searched.  Indeed, the findings of numerous studies throughout the 
country have been so consistent that police officials are starting to recognize that 
racial profiling, while still practiced broadly, is ineffective and should be 
rejected (ACLU  Sanctioned Bias, 2004, p. 2).” 
The Department of Justice, in a 2001 national study they conducted 
based on citizen-police contacts in 1999 found that “blacks account for 70 
percent of all routine traffic stops.  The Department of Justice also found that 
although African-Americans and Hispanics were more likely to be stopped and 
searched, they were less likely to be in possession of contraband (Hutchinson, 
2002, p. 1).”  “On average, searches and seizures of African-American drivers 
yielded evidence only 8 percent of the time, searches and seizures of Hispanic 
drivers yielded evidence only 10 percent of the time, and searches and seizures 
of white drivers yielded evidence 17 percent of the time (ERPA, 2004, p. 3).” 
An Ohio study conducted by David A. Harris found that “blacks 
driving in the Ohio metropolitan areas of Toledo, Akron, Dayton and Columbus 
were twice as likely to receive tickets as non-blacks (whites, Hispanics, and 
other ethnic groups) (Ward, 2004, p. 2).” 
“Similarly, a study conducted by the Orlando Sentinel observed a drug 
interdiction program in 1992 along a stretch of Interstate 95 in Florida.  Some of 
the deputies’ cars involved in traffic-related stops were equipped with video 
cameras.  Video tapes from almost 1,100 stops were viewed by the newspaper.  
The tapes showed that about 70 percent of the drivers who were stopped on a 
stretch of highway were African-American, whereas only 5 percent of the 
drivers were black (Ward, 2004 p. 2). 
The San Diego Police Department in collecting and analyzing police 
reported traffic stop data found that “San Diego police searched vehicles driven 
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by Hispanic drivers more often than white drivers (51.6% versus 24.5%).  
However, searches of vehicles driven by whites yielded hits twice as often as 
vehicles driven by Hispanics (11.7% versus 5.0%).  There was no difference in 
vehicle search rates or hit rates between vehicles driven by African Americans 
and whites (Lundman 3, 2004).”   
The Oakland Police Department in partnership with the RAND 
Corporation, an independent non-profit research organization conducted a study 
of data collected by the Oakland Police Department that consisted of 7, 067 
recorded vehicle stops between June 15, 2003 and December 30, 2003.  In a 
report released in 2004, they “found mixed evidence of whether racial bias was 
involved in the initial decision by police to stop particular motorists.” However, 
“evidence of racial bias [existed] in certain traffic enforcement actions by police, 
including weapons searches of motorists stopped by officers (Racial Profiling 
(NEU - Oakland), 2004, p. 1).” 
Researchers at the University of Minnesota Law School’s Institute on 
Race and Poverty analyzed data provided by sixty-five Minnesota police 
departments in 2002 and found disturbing results.  They reported that police 
“searched Blacks, Latinos, and American Indians at greater rates than White 
drivers, and found contraband as a result of searches of Blacks, Latinos, and 
American Indians at lower rates than in searches of White drivers (Lundman, 
2004, p. 3).” 
Rep. John Conyers commented regarding the mounting evidence of 
racial profiling being collected nationwide: 
“Media coverage of the phenomenon of racial profiling has produced 
an abundance of anecdotal evidence concerning abusive practices.  In 
addition, statistical evidence gathered in the course of litigation shows a 
clear pattern of racially discriminatory traffic stops and searches. 
Although African-Americans make up only 14% of the population, 
they account for 72 percent of all routine traffic stops.  Latinos are 
similarly targeted for a disproportionate law enforcement focus.  One 
ACLU analysis indicated that Latinos comprised approximately 30 
percent of the motorists stopped by one state’s police drug interdiction 
officers, even though they only accounted for eight percent of the 
personal vehicle trips (Conyers, 2001).” 
Rep. Conyers also expressed “When we speak of the problem of police 
misconduct incurred in our nation, our concerns are greatly aggravated by the 
fact that all of the high profile cases involve persons of color (Scott 2000, p. 1). 
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CONCLUSIONS & DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
Policy Debate 
 
The key government agency that would be essential in the 
implementation and administration of national racial profiling legislation is the 
U.S. Department of Justice.  The Department of Justice currently reviews civil 
rights complaints and has its Pattern or Practice authority to initiate 
investigations into racial profiling and discrimination occurring within the 
criminal justice system.  The Department of Justice also issued federal 
guidelines in 2003 prohibiting the practice of racial profiling by federal law 
enforcement agencies.  It would be appropriate for the Department of Justice to 
oversee and accept complaints of racial profiling as a civil rights violation.  Rep. 
Conyers has publicly acknowledged that the financial and technical support of 
the Department of Justice in administering the logistics of the bill is essential. 
The Attorney General in Justice Department and their office are 
assigned the responsibility in the End Racial Profiling Act of 2004, of 
administering the legislation.  The Attorney General would have the authority to 
add to the legislation before passage, authorizes compliance grants, and enforces 
the legislation by using their authority to reduce or suspend appropriations of 
funding to law enforcement agencies if there are violations of the act.  The 
office of the Attorney General would additionally be responsible for receiving 
the nationwide data collection, analyzing the data, and submitting a report to 
Congress on their findings annually. 
Early proponents of racial profiling legislation are the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and the National 
Action Network (NAN).  Additional early supporters of the legislation include 
The National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE), 
the American Bar Association, Advocates and Leaders for Police and 
Community Trust (ALPACT) , professors of law, investigative journalists and 
numerous minority advocacy groups.  
Many proponents added their support to the national racial profiling 
legislation after the tragedy of September 11, 2001 and the advent of the Patriot 
Act including The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Amnesty 
International, The American Psychological Association (APA), The National 
Conference for Community and Justice, The International Association of Chiefs 
of Police, the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium and the 
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights. 
Racial profiling used to be viewed as primarily an African-American 
and Latino American issue.  Yet, after many Arab, Muslim, and Asian citizens 
and non-citizens were racially profiled and subjected to detainment, searches, 
questioning, and deportation by law enforcement, sanctioned by the Justice 
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Department after September 11th, the issue of racial profiling became a broader 
issue.  The End Racial Profiling Act of 2004 specifically addresses the treatment 
of these groups within the legislative proposal.  Protections against racial 
profiling against persons based on their religious affiliations was an “add in” to 
the End Racial Profiling Act as well.  The coalition that formerly existed of 
primarily African-American and Latino advocacy groups has expanded to 
include multiple minority advocacy groups and international civil/human rights 
organizations.  The result of the strengthened coalition supporting national 
profiling legislation was evident in the support of The End Racial Profiling Act 
of 2004 which had 126 co-sponsors.  
Opponents of racial profiling legislation who lobbied against its 
passage include the Grand Lodge Fraternal Order of Police and the National 
Association of Police Organizations (NAPO) and the International Association 
of Chiefs of Police.  Also many government officials, law enforcement agencies, 
police administrators and officers nationwide opposed the legislation. 
The major interest groups are the ACLU, Amnesty International, the 
NAACP, NAPO and the Grand Lodge Fraternal Order of Police.  Law 
enforcement agencies in general and national leaders have also played an 
important role in organizing politically against national racial profiling 
legislation and contributed to the non-passage of the bills.  The NAPO 
organization represents more than 220,000 law enforcement officers nationwide.  
When the Traffic Stops Statistics Act was introduced in 1998, NAPO lobbied 
actively against its passage and credits its organization with stalling the bill in 
the Senate (NAPO, 1999). Robert T. Scully the executive director of NAPO, 
stated in a press release in 1999 after Conyers re-introduced the Traffic Stops 
Statistics Act,  
“What I think needs to be made clear to the American public is that 
there is no need for new legislation on this issue.  The Attorney General 
of this country already has the authority to collect this data in any area 
of the country where she sees a problem of alleged racial profiling by 
police officers during traffic stops (NAPO, 1999, p. 1).” He added in 
response to the new 1999 legislation, “The newly proposed bill would 
make the data readily available to the cottage industry of lawyers who 
make their living suing police officers across the country (NAPO, 
1999, p. 1).”   
 
The ACLU described racial profiling “as the leading civil rights issue 
of the 1990s (Scott, 2000, p. 3).  The ACLU filed a class-action lawsuit on 
behalf of the Maryland NAACP.  The suit charged that the Maryland Police use 
discriminatory racial-profiling techniques in stopping drivers.  The NAACP and 
11 plaintiffs sought damages on behalf of themselves and hundreds of minority 
motorists who have been arbitrarily stopped and searched by officers for drugs.  
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The ACLU filed a suit earlier against the California Highway Patrol 
and the Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement, accusing both of racial profiling.  
Later that year in September 1999, California Gov. Gray Davis vetoed a bill by 
state Senator Kevin Murray, D-Culver City that would have required the 
California Highway Patrol and major police and sheriff’s departments to record 
detailed information on their enforcement activities including total stops, the 
number of arrests, warnings and citations, and the reason for the stops (Scott, 
2000).  
The reason’s Gray supplied for vetoing the bill were that the “bill could 
cost too much and place a heavy burden on police (Scott, 2000, p. 3)”.  Gray 
stated that there was “no evidence that this practice is taking place statewide 
requiring sweeping legislation that mandates state scrutiny of every local law 
enforcement agency in California (Scott, 2000, p. 3). 
There was further opposition from law enforcement officials in 
California.  The Los Angeles Police Chief, Bernard Parks opposed a traffic stops 
study, as he stated “my agency does not engage in racial profiling and need not 
study the issue (Scott, 2000, p. 4).” 
Sheriff Lee Baca of the Los Angeles Police stated he would not require 
his department to participate in a racial profiling study despite a formal request 
by the board in November of 1999. 
It is interesting to note that when legislation was first introduced in 
1998 and 1999 most law enforcement agencies denied the existence of racial 
profiling.  Yet, as the issue came to the forefront of the media and pressure was 
placed on certain states and local law enforcement agencies to actually collect 
data on traffic stops the defense tactics changed.  As more and more statistical 
proof emerged and investigations by the Department of Justice confirmed the 
existence of racial profiling practices, the defense became that minorities are 
arrested and incarcerated at a higher rate, so therefore they commit more crimes 
and that racial profiling is appropriate. 
The political landscape also changed since the conversion from 
Democratic leadership to Republican Leadership in January 2001.  Since this 
conversion only two new Pattern or Practice Investigations have been initiated 
by the Department of Justice (McMickle, 2003).  Additionally, if national racial 
profiling legislation could not be passed with Democratic leadership, it has a 
slim chance of being passed in a Republican controlled House and Senate.  The 
End Racial Profiling Act of 2004 had no republican sponsors.  Republican 
legislators do not support this legislation.  Additionally, even when issuing 
guidelines for federal law enforcement and speaking out against the practice of 
racial profiling, both President Bush and U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, 
publicly expressed their support for law enforcement and have made no attempts 
to support national racial profiling legislation.  Although especially after 
September 11th racial profiling has affected most minorities in the country, 
national racial profiling legislation is not part of the Republican agenda. 
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Evaluation of Advocacy Efforts  
 
There were a few minority and civil liberties groups lobbying for the 
passage of the Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1998.  Support was building for the 
legislation in 1999 and that interest grew tremendously after September 11, 
2001.   At this point the legislation took on broad mass appeal because of the 
country’s focus on national security and the allegations of Arabic, Muslim and 
Asian citizens and non-citizens being harassed and detained unnecessarily.  
The advocacy efforts on the part of the sponsors of the bill could have 
stronger had they taken a broader approach in the beginning, forming a coalition 
with other minority groups. The protection of Americans’ constitutional rights 
and civil liberties affects all Americans.  Profiling based on race (any race) is 
discriminatory and a violation of civil rights whether an individual is stopped on 
the street, in their car, at the airport, or elsewhere. 
However, I wonder would other minority groups would have been 
interested in the issue of racial profiling prior to September 11th?  Did other 
minority groups feel insolated from racial profiling prior to that tragic day that 
made Americans question their freedom, national and personal security?  My 
impression is that due to the racial tension between African-Americans and 
White Americans in the United States, most minority groups felt that racial 
harassment and discrimination issues were somehow “owned” by African-
Americans and possibly Latino Americans. 
There were many small local groups within the states supporting state 
racial profiling legislation, yet only the NAACP and the ACLU were making 
national statements early on supporting the proposed Traffic Stops Statistics Act 
of 1998 and 1999.  If Rep. Conyers, Sen. Feingold and other co-sponsors of the 
bill would have garnered support from a number of national agencies to form a 
national alliance supporting this legislation in the beginning I believe it would 
have made a difference.   
The importance of a national coalition of grassroots organizers, human 
rights organizations, law enforcement officers and civil libertarians was 
apparent.  After September 11th, many advocacy and civil rights groups jumped 
on the bandwagon and began making national statements denouncing racial 
profiling by law enforcement officials and publicly supporting The End Racial 
Profiling Act such as Amnesty International a human rights activist organization 
with 1.5 million members, The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and The 
American Psychological Association. If an effort would have been made to build 
a larger coalition earlier it would have made an impact.   
NAPO represents 220,000 members and the Grand Lodge Fraternal 
Order of Police 310,000 members.  These numbers represent power.  Even 
President Bush when calling for federal law enforcement agencies to investigate 
the use of profiling on a federal level, made sure to mention the dedication of 
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police officers and not wanting legislation to interfere with law enforcement 
officers protecting the country.  Ashcroft also stated that he would follow the 
President’s directive yet would “follow the laws on the books.”  The influence 
of law enforcement and their advocacy efforts has been very powerful in the 
non-passage of the national racial profiling legislation.   
The ACLU made strong statements with lawsuits and in the media.  
Following the release of each racial profiling bill, the ACLU sent out press 
releases with their support.  The ACLU set up a hotline for citizens to call if 
they felt they had been racially profiled and tracked the numbers, races and 
states complaints were received from.  The ACLU tracked all of the national and 
state level studies, conducted their own gallop polls and set up action alerts for 
citizens to write members of Congress supporting the legislation.  The ACLU 
has invested time and resources in the issue and they are current with their facts.  
The support of the ACLU has been critical; yet by itself, it wasn’t enough.  
One of key components that was absent from the advocacy debate were 
testimonials of incidents where minorities were racially profiled.  Civil Rights 
advocacy groups have been collecting this information, yet testimonials of 
various minority groups may make an impact by giving racial profiling a 
personal face.  Although statistical evidence is essential to the proving the 
existence of racial profiling practices, testimonials would help in transferring 
anecdotal evidence to stronger evidence and eventually the strength of anecdotal 
evidence would be hard to dispute as well. 
Conyers implied that the public denouncing of Racial Profiling by the 
Clinton and Bush administrations was just rhetoric.  Although the bill was not 
passed, President Clinton did at least support the Traffic Stops Statistics Act in 
1999 before Congress.  However, President Clinton was motivated to sustain his 
minority support. President Bush’s motivation I believe, as suggested by critics 
of his actions, was to make a token statement denouncing the act of Racial 
Profiling in order to gain minority support.  Yet, he did not publicly support 
racial profiling legislation on a state and local level.  The federal guidelines were 
not enacted until after Sept. 11th as the issue garnered greater interest group 
support and media attention. 
Rep. Conyers held a press conference after the DOJ announcement of 
guidelines issued in 2003.  This was effective because although minority groups, 
the ACLU and other civil liberty and human rights groups were speaking out 
against the guidelines, Rep. Conyers the author of the national racial profiling 
legislation, needed to let the public know his stance on the new guidelines.  In 
his press release, Conyers remained positive as he stated that the guidelines were 
not enough on a federal level yet encouraged the DOJ to work with him to pass 
legislation on a state and local level.  
The tone of Rep. Conyers and Sen. Feingold has remained firm yet 
positive.  Both Rep. Conyers and Sen. Feingold provided press releases after the 
introduction of The End Racial Profiling Act of 2004, stating that President 
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Bush pledged to end racial profiling in a Joint Session of Congress in 2001 and 
asked President Bush and Congress to uphold his promise by supporting and 
passing this legislation ending racial profiling on the federal, state and local 
levels.  Rep. Conyers and Sen. Feingold indicated how the anecdotal evidence 
was supported all over the country through statistical studies, that indicated 
proof of a pervasive problem of profiling minorities based on race, ethnicity, 
religion and national origin.  Both Feingold and Conyers expressed the 
expansiveness of the problem since September 11th.  It was important for both 
Rep. Conyers and Sen. Feingold to publicly hold President Bush to his word, 
express the solidarity of all minority groups supporting the legislation and to 
indicate the data collection studies and their results around the country. 
 
Evaluation of Proposed Racial Profiling Legislation 
 
 The 1998 & 1999 Traffic Stops Statistics Acts focused on the Attorney 
General requiring state and local law enforcement agencies to collect data in 
order to establish a national study.  The intent of the study was to determine the 
magnitude and severity of racial profiling on a national level.  This was realistic 
for a modest start to the legislation.  Rep. Conyers vision was that because more 
and more anecdotal evidence was emerging, a study would be worthwhile to 
determine how pervasive the practice of racial profiling is and to analyze the 
issue.  However, when the Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1998 passed 
unanimously in the House, and was widely publicized in the press, law 
enforcement agencies and associations quickly lobbied against the bill’s passage 
and the bill stalled in the Senate. 
The End Racial Profiling Act of 2001 was more aggressive then the Traffic 
Studies Statistics Acts.  ERPA of 2001 called for policies on racial profiling to 
be implemented, the potential for grants to be withheld if policies were not in 
place, an established complaint procedure, a discipline procedure and monetary 
remedies for victims of racial profiling.   
Although The End Racial Profiling Act was more comprehensive then the 
previous attempts the question emerges, if Congress would not pass a bill 
authorizing a national study, why would they authorize a bill defining racial 
profiling misconduct and agree to discipline officers and pay monetary damages 
to victims?  Rep. Conyers and his co-sponsors were trying to make the point that 
anecdotal evidence had advanced to proof.  They wanted real regulations in 
place, however the Congressional support was just not there for national 
legislation to be passed.  If the legislation could not be passed under the Clinton 
Administration, the Bush Administration definitely was not posed to pass the 
legislation. One of the weaknesses with the End Racial Profiling Act of 2001 
legislation was that  
the “how” of how law enforcement agencies and the Attorney General would 
determine evidence of  racial profiling was unclear.  Conyers admitted that this 
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may be a hurdle to blocking the passage of the bill.  The bill relied on whether 
there was disparate impact on minorities.  This is why legislation for the study 
should have been pushed for passage first.  With the data collected, an idea of 
the impact could be assessed and guidelines could be established based on the 
“proof” obtained. Rep. Conyers also admitted that the defining racial profiling 
and establishing legal ramifications for the practice was a complex task.  
Conyers noted, 
  
“While the catch phrase “driving while black” captures the perception 
of the minority community, the definition of racial profiling embraces 
the widespread police practice of using race as a factor in deciding 
whom to target for law enforcement.  Properly understood, racial 
profiling occurs whenever police routinely use race as a negative signal 
that, along with an accumulation of other signals, causes an officer to 
react with suspicion (Conyers, 2001, p. 1).” 
 
However, The End Racial Profiling Act of 2004 contained a clear definition of 
racial profiling indicating that racial profiling is “the practice of relying on race, 
ethnicity, religion or national origin to select which individuals are subject to a 
law enforcement encounter (ACLU Sanctioned Bias 2004, p. 3).”   
Another issue with the racial profiling legislation in general is how do 
you streamline and regulate data collection so that is consistent across all law 
enforcement agencies, and represent reliable sources of data.  Also how do you 
prevent law enforcement officers from skewing the data?  If the legislation 
passes, law enforcement officers would be instructed to collect data.  It has 
already been alleged in some of the state legislatively mandated studies and the 
voluntary studies that law enforcement officers have underreported findings.  
The Department of Justice would be key in establishing the guidelines and 
strictly regulating the process.  However, how do they limit abuses?   
The End Racial Profiling Act of 2001 and 2004 called for grants to be 
made to law enforcement agencies that needed technical assistance creating 
policies and for equipment etc.  Possibly the use of video cameras and moving 
surveillance equipment would serve as a checkpoint to ensure the accuracy of 
the data.  However if data is disputed, does the DOJ have the resource time to 
investigate video tapes? 
The End Racial Profiling Act of 2004 was written well, and 
strengthened with all of the data collections and statistical evidence of racial 
profiling found by law enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice, social 
scientists, non-profits and research institutions who have conducted studies 
across the country.   However it is absolutely critical to have a national 
“reliable” commissioned study with standardized methods for collecting data 
and the appropriate “benchmarks” to be used to compare the collected data.  
This data should be collected in traffic stops, yet possibly in airports as well.  
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Nonprofit research institutions could continue to work in collaboration with law 
enforcement agencies and The Department of Justice should be responsible for 
ensuring the validity and reliability of the studies. The Attorney General would 
then be responsible under the act of presenting a report of the analyzed collected 
data to Congress.  It may be helpful for the Department of Justice to analyze the 
data on state, local, regional and national levels. 
Another issue law enforcement officials brought up regarding racial 
profiling legislation was where would the funding come from?  Before 
introducing the legislation in 2001, the sponsors of the bill should have 
investigated Department of Justice budget cuts.  They were suggesting that the 
funding for the bill come from the Department of Justice yet with national 
support of law enforcement, how would the DOJ approve funding a program to 
police the police when Community Policing Programs were being cut?  Law 
enforcement agencies emphasize that they are in place to protect the public and 
if their community policing programs can be cut, then racial profiling funding 
should not be a priority.  Some alternative funding sources should have been 
identified by the sponsors of the End Racial Profiling Act of 2001. 
However, the End Racial Profiling Act of 2004 did specifically indicate 
that funding for the act would come from multiple sources; the Edward Byrne 
Memorial State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Programs and the Cops 
on the Beat Program, both outlined in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968 and The Local Law Enforcement Block Grant program of 
the Department of Justice (ERPA, 2004).  This diversification of funding for 
The End Racial Profiling Act of 2004 is a strong addition to the legislation. 
Overall, it is my assessment that the mounting anecdotal reports of 
racial profiling and statistical studies conducted are evidence of actual proof of 
racial profiling in the United States.  After Sept. 11th the issue of racial profiling 
has developed into a broader issue.  What I question is how widespread is the 
problem?  Is the problem greater depending on regional characteristics?  
Although there have been several local and state studies, a national study will 
provide solidified statistical proof of a pervasive problem of racial profiling by 
law enforcement in the United States and will add needed credibility to The End 
Racial Profiling Act legislation.  The national racial profiling legislation already 
has the support of civil libertarians, human rights organizations, democratic 
legislators, and minority groups that it needs.  The study needs to be conducted 
to establish proof of racial profiling practices across the country and if the data 
discovers that an overwhelming number of minorities are profiled in traffic or 
other stops, inconsistent with the minority “population” being considered or 
with the number of White Americans profiled, then the proof will be evident.  
Based on proof, guidelines can be established to end the practice of racial 
profiling and to enforce citizens’ constitutional rights to equal protection of the 
laws and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
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All citizens of the United States recognize the need for increased 
security after September 11th.  However, there has to be a balance between 
creating safe and efficient security measures and protecting the citizen’s of the 
United States civil liberties and protections under U.S. Constitutional law.  
Racial profiling creates fear and erodes trust that minority communities have in 
law enforcement and discourages needed cooperation from these communities.  
Racial profiling is a threat to all of our security because if police are 
concentrating on race and not using good policing methods and stopping 
suspects based on suspicious criminal behavior then we are all less safe.  Many 
fear that the liberties given to law enforcement to combat the so-called “war on 
terror” and other discretionary powers will extend to greater liberties under the 
law in giving law enforcement broader powers to abuse the civil rights of 
minority American citizens and non-citizens. 
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